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Abstract—Logic Encryption is one of the most popular hard-
ware security techniques which can prevent IP piracy and
illegal IC overproduction. It introduces obfuscation by inserting
some extra hardware into a design to hide its functionality
from unauthorized users. Correct functionality of an encrypted
design depends upon the application of correct keys, shared
only with the authorized users. In the recent past, extensive
efforts have been devoted in extracting the secret key of an
encrypted design. At the same time, several countermeasures
have also been proposed by the research community to thwart
different state-of-the-art attacks on logic encryption. However,
most of the proposed countermeasures fail to prevent the powerful
SAT attack. Although a few researchers have proposed different
solutions to withstand SAT attack, those solutions suffer from
several drawbacks such as high design overheads, low output
corruptibility, and vulnerability against removal attack. Almost
all the known logic encryption strategies are vulnerable to scan
based attack. In this paper, we propose a novel encryption
technique called Encrypt Flip-Flop, which encrypts the outputs of
selected flip-flops by inserting multiplexers (MUX). The proposed
strategy can thwart all the known attacks including SAT and scan
based attacks. The scheme has low design overhead and imple-
mentation complexity. Experimental results on several ISCAS’89
and ITC’99 benchmarks show that our proposed method can
produce reasonable output corruption for wrong keys.
Keywords—Hardware Security, Logic Encryption, key-gates, at-
tacks and countermeasures, overheads, output corruption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever increasing market demand for smarter, faster and
smaller products motivates the electronics design industry to
develop complex chips with a wide range of functionalities
like digital, analog, radio frequency, photonic, integrated into
a single chip. Manufacturing these complex chips requires
advanced mixed technology fabrication facilities. The enor-
mous cost of setting up and maintaining such fabrication lab
(cost of owning a foundry is about $5 billion [1]) is the
main impediment for small design houses to own an in-house
foundry. However, globalization in the semiconductor industry
has facilitated integrated circuit (IC) designers to outsource the
fabrication of their designs to offshore foundries. Although this
trend significantly cuts down the cost, at the same time, it has
also opened the backdoor for several security vulnerabilities
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Figure 1: Block diagram of Logic Encryption [6]
like Intellectual Property (IP) piracy, counterfeiting, reverse en-
gineering, overbuilding, insertion of hardware Trojans [2], [3].
The accessibility of the GDS-II file to the third party foundry
personnel exposes the IP of a design. An untrustworthy user
in the foundry may reverse engineer the GDS-II file and claim
the ownership of the IP. Illegal overproduction and selling the
excess ICs is another possible trend of stealing a design. These
kinds of design thefts cost the semiconductor industry a loss of
several billions of dollars, every year [4]. To withstand these
security threats, Design-for-Security (DfS) has emerged to be
a conjoined part of IC design.
Logic encryption is a popular countermeasure to restrict IP
piracy and illegal overproduction by the foundry. Using logic
encryption, a designer can introduce some redundant logic
elements (key-gates) into a circuit to conceal its functionality
from a third party foundry. Correct functionality of an en-
crypted IC depends on the application of the correct keys to
the key-gates. The fabricated IC is activated by applying the
secret keys when it returns back to the design house from
the foundry [5]. These secret keys are stored in a tamper-
proof memory inside the chip. Unavailability of the correct
keys inhibits an unauthorized user from reverse engineering
the GDS-II file, and claiming the ownership of the design.
Illegally over-produced ICs cannot be sold in the market as
these chips do not exhibit correct functionality until they are
activated with the exact keys. Figure 1 shows a basic block
diagram of logic encryption.
II. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARY IDEAS
Logic encryption can be either sequential or combinational
in nature. Sequential logic encryption [7] introduces a Finite
State Machine (FSM) which uses some of the primary inputs
of the original circuit as its inputs. The state transition graph
is modified with some additional logic states, called black
states. A correct input sequence is required to reach a valid
state, which allows the correct functionality of the encrypted
circuit. Wrong input sequence restricts the operation of the
chip by entering into one of the black states. On the other hand,
combinational logic encryption techniques use XOR/XNOR
gates [3], [8], [9] to encrypt a netlist. Few other methods
use AND/OR gates [10], multiplexers (MUX) [8], [11], Look
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Figure 2: An example of logic encryption. (a) original netlist, (b) encryption using XOR/XNOR gates, (c) encryption using MUX
Up Tables (LUT) [12] as key-gates. The XOR/XNOR based
encryption technique was introduced in EPIC [3]. This method
randomly inserts XOR/XNOR gates (key-gates) into a design.
One input of the XOR/XNOR gate is connected to some
internal line of the circuit, while the other input serves as a
key-input. Figure 2(b) shows a typical example of XOR/XNOR
based logic encryption which encrypts the circuit of Figure 2(a)
using three key-gates, KG1, KG2, and KG3. These key-gates
are configured as buffers upon applying correct keys, else they
invert the lines, leading to wrong output for invalid keys.
In MUX-based encryption [8], several 2 input-MUXes are
inserted into a design. Two different lines (one true line and
one false line) of the circuit are connected to the inputs of
a MUX, while the select line of the MUX acts as the key.
Correct values of the keys propagate the values at the true lines
to the outputs of the MUXes. Figure 2(c) shows an example of
MUX based logic encryption. Another MUX-based encryption
considers obfuscation cell (OC) (a combination of a MUX and
an inverter) to encrypt a design [11]. In [13], Wang et al. have
proposed an encryption technique which uses a combination of
MUX and camouflage connectors as configurable logic units
to replace certain logic gates.
To activate an encrypted IC, an unauthorized user must
extract the correct keys. If an IC with M inputs is encrypted
with K keys, a brute force attack requires 2M observations
from an active IC and O(2M+K) computations on an encrypted
design. This is practically impossible for sufficiently large
values of M and K. Although these methods seem to secure a
design from theft, some later research works have pointed out
several shortcomings, which can expose a logically encrypted
circuit to several attacks. However, every time a new attack has
been proposed, researchers have come forward with a modified
strategy to logically encrypt a design, which eventually has
evolved logic encryption techniques towards more secure and
better ways to thwart different security vulnerabilities.
III. EVOLUTION OF LOGIC ENCRYPTION
One important criterion of logic encryption is that incorrect
keys must produce wrong outputs. This implies that the effect
of incorrect keys should propagate to the outputs and corrupt
some of the output bits. The EPIC method [3] of logic en-
cryption randomly inserts key-gates into the design. However,
random insertion of key-gates does not always ensure high
output corruption for incorrect keys, as the effect of wrong
key may get masked by other inputs, thus, may not propagate
to the output. To ensure high output corruption for invalid keys,
a fault analysis based key-gate location selection approach has
been proposed in [8].
Fault analysis based logic encryption [8]: This method
uses three basic phenomena, fault excitation, fault propagation
and fault masking of IC testing to identify several locations
in the circuit, where if any fault occurs (either s-a-0 or s-a-1),
propagates to the output and corrupts a maximum number of
output bits for most of the applied input patterns. Insertion of
key-gates in these locations ensures high output corruption for
wrong keys.
Although, the fault analysis based technique [8] fulfills the
criterion of high output corruption for wrong keys, some later
research works have shown that both random and fault analysis
based key-gate insertion approaches are vulnerable to several
attacks, such as, logic cone analysis [14], hill-climbing [15],
path sensitization [9], and SAT-based [16] attacks.
The basic requirements for these attacks are 1) an encrypted
netlist, available in the foundry, and 2) a functional IC,
available in the market. An attacker applies the same input
to both the circuits and compares the outputs to extract the
keys. Using these attacks an attacker can extract the keys of
an encrypted design.
Logic cone analysis based attack [14]: This attack aims
to minimize the effort of brute force attack by following a
divide and conquer strategy to explore the keys. It checks the
number of key-gates affecting each of the outputs and targets
the output with the smallest number of key-gates in its input
cone of dependency. A brute force attack on an output which
is affected by the fewest number of key-gates is a feasible
solution to extract a subpart of the keys. In each iteration, the
process searches for the outputs with less number of key-gates
in their input cone of dependencies and applies brute force to
extract a small portion of the entire key set. To prevent logic
cone analysis based attack, Lee et al. have proposed strategic
insertion of some MUXes into the design [14]. The process
creates more overlap between the logic cones, which increases
the number of key-gates in the input cone of dependency of
each output.
Hill Climbing Attack [15]: This attack starts by applying
an initial random key to an encrypted netlist and measuring
the Hamming distance between the obtained and the expected
correct outputs of a functional chip. With the ultimate goal of
obtaining zero Hamming distance for any set of input patterns,
each iteration of the attack takes a decision whether to flip a
key-bit or not. The attack succeeds on the finding of such a
key which can produce zero Hamming distance between the
observed and the correct outputs for all input patterns.
Path sensitization attack [9]: A key-bit can be sensitized
to the output by selecting specific input pattern if no other
key-gates interfere in the sensitization path of the key-bit. A
3similar kind of input pattern is applied to both functional IC
and encrypted netlist. Observation of the outputs of these two
circuits can reveal the key values.
Strong logic locking [9]: To prevent path sensitization
attack, Yasin et al. have proposed a strong logic locking
strategy [9] by inserting key-gates in such locations which
forms a clique where all nodes (key-gates) interfere with each
other. The size of the clique reflects the length of the key. This
strategy ensures that sensitization of any key-gate to an output
requires applying suitable values to the primary inputs as well
as other key inputs. As the other keys are not known to an
attacker, no key can be sensitized to the output. One drawback
of this topology dependent key-gate insertion strategy is that
it may not offer ample key-gate locations to encrypt a design
with sufficient number of keys. Moreover, as the key-gates are
placed with an objective to increase the clique size, it does not
always ensure high output corruption for wrong keys.
External key-dependency [6], [17]: To overcome the draw-
backs of strong logic locking, Karmakar et al. have proposed
an iterative approach which can prevent path sensitization
attack as well as ensure high output corruption for invalid
keys [6]. The nonlinear interdependency among the primary
and secondary keys of this external key-dependency based
encryption strategy helps to thwart both hill climbing and
logic cone based attacks. However, these methods [6], [17]
incur some extra hardware to incorporate the key-dependency
unit into the design, which also increases the power and delay
overheads of the design.
SAT-based attack [16]: Recently, a powerful SAT attack
was proposed in [16]. This attack uses a SAT-based algorithm
to extract the keys of a logically encrypted combinational
circuit. The attack algorithm iteratively searches for a special
set of distinguished input patterns (DIPs), which help
to reduce the key search space by eliminating the incorrect
keys. A DIP ensures that at least two different keys produce
different outputs. Comparison of the outputs with the output
of a functional chip, for the same DIP , helps to eliminate
at least one or both the keys as incorrect keys. The attack
shows that using a limited number of DIPs, all the incorrect
keys can be eliminated and an equivalent set of correct keys
can be revealed. Another SAT-based attack called AppSAT
was proposed in [18], which can approximately deobfuscate
an encrypted netlist with very low error rate.
SAT-resilient techniques: The complexity of SAT-based
attack depends on the complexity of the circuit as well as
the number of DIP s required to eliminate all the wrong keys.
To prevent SAT attack, Yasin et al. have proposed to integrate
some extra hardware (called SARLock) [19] with strong logic
locking [9], that increases the effort of SAT attack by expo-
nentially increasing the number of DIPs to eliminate all the
incorrect keys. The proposed SARLock method modifies the
outputs in such a way that an incorrect key produces a wrong
output only for a specific input pattern. Therefore, a DIP can
eliminate only one incorrect key. For a sufficiently long key, the
exponential number of required DIP s makes the SAT attack
impossible. However, some later research [20] has shown that
SARLock is vulnerable to removal attack. To mitigate the
removal attack, Yasin et al. have proposed a new SAT-resilient
encryption technique called TTLock [20] which modifies a
logic cone by flipping the output for a secret input pattern and
restores the flip for correct keys. Another SAT-based attack
called Double DIP [21] has been proposed in recent time,
which can avoid the exponential iteration of key search process
incorporated by the SARLock method. Yang et al. have also
proposed to use an Anti-SAT block [22] to exponentially
increase the number of SAT attack iterations to reveal the
correct key. However, the security of Anti-SAT block can be
bypassed using a Signal Probability Skew (SPS) attack [23]. In
[24], Xu et al. have also shown that both SARLock and Anti-
SAT are vulnerable to a new bypass attack. In [25], Xie et al.
have proposed to use tunable delay key-gates (TDK) to encrypt
a design. The proposed Delay Locking strategy considers two
keys for each TDK, one for functional locking and the other
for manipulating the delay. The introduction of timing violation
for wrong delay keys helps this method to thwart SAT attack.
Another SAT-resilient secure cell design technique has been
proposed in [26]. A cyclic obfuscation based SAT-resilience
encryption technique has been proposed in [27], which creates
logical loop in a circuit by adding dummy wires and gates.
The approach ensures that all the inserted cycles have multiple
ways to open. As the circuit can no longer be represented as
a directed acyclic graph (DAG), the conventional SAT-based
attack cannot be applied to extract the keys. However, Zhou et
al. recently proposed an algorithm called CycSAT [28], which
can effectively decrypt cyclic obfuscation.
In recent times, several transistor level logic encryption
techniques have been proposed in [29], [30]. Chen et al.
have proposed a low overhead gate replacement technique [31]
for logic encryption. The proposed technique can significantly
reduce the area, power, and delay overheads, compared to
the typical XOR/XNOR based encryption, however, it fails to
thwart SAT attack.
IV. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE PAPER
In the previous section, we have observed several short-
comings of different logic encryption strategies. For example,
strong logic locking [9] can thwart path sensitization and
hill climbing attacks, however, sometimes fails to encrypt a
design with a sufficiently large number of keys. Similarly,
external key-dependency based approach [6] prevents path
sensitization, hill climbing, and logic cone based attacks at
the cost of higher hardware, power, and delay overheads,
compared to other methods. We have also observed that most
of the logic encryption strategies are vulnerable to SAT-
based attack. Although the SARLock [19] and Anti-SAT [22]
methods restrict the SAT attack, they require extra hardware
to increase the effort of SAT-attack. The SARLock method
modifies a design in such a way that even for a wrong key, the
circuit produces correct output for most of the inputs, which
may not be a desirable criterion from a designer’s point of
view. Moreover, both SARLcok and Anti-SAT methods are
vulnerable to removal attack. Most of the existing logic en-
cryption strategies fail to prevent all the known state-of-the-art
attacks while simultaneously fulfilling the basic requirements
like high output corruptibility, low design overhead and low
4implementation complexity. These observations clearly show
that despite a substantial amount of research, logic encryption
methods are yet to get matured enough, which leaves room
for further improvements. The demand for a low overhead and
secured way to logically encrypt a design has motivated us to
develop a new logic encryption strategy.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows.
1) We propose a scan based attack which exploits the DfT
infrastructure to partition a circuit into multiple smaller
sub-circuits and attack them individually. The attack can
drastically reduce the complexity of any state-of-the-art
attack on any logically encrypted sequential circuit.
2) To prevent the proposed attack, we introduce a new
logic encryption strategy, which encrypts the outputs of
the flip-flops. The proposed Encrypt Flip-flop strategy
ensures that the scan chains do not leak any key
information, thus, prevent scan based attack.
3) The proposed encryption strategy restricts the control-
lability and observability of the flip-flops of the scan
chains. This inhibits an attacker to apply SAT-based
attack by converting a sequential design to a combina-
tional one using scan facility. Unlike other methods our
method does not incur any extra hardware to prevent
SAT attack.
4) The proposed low overhead encryption strategy can also
prevent other state-of-the-art attacks, like path sensiti-
zation, hill climbing, and logic cone based attacks.
V. PROPOSED SCAN BASED ATTACK ON LOGIC
ENCRYPTION
In this section, we present an attack on conventional logic
encryption techniques, which uses the phenomenon of scan
based side channel attack. We show that the scan chains of a
design can be exploited to drastically reduce the complexity
of several state-of-the-art attacks on logic encryption.
Attack Infrastructure: Like other attacks on logic encryp-
tion, our proposed attack also requires an encrypted netlist and
an activated IC. The attack assumes that the design contains
flip-flops and the activated IC has DfT infrastructure [32], [33]
(i.e. in full scan environment, all flip-flops get replaced by
scan flip-flops, and are connected in a chain) for the purpose
of infield testing and debugging. Figure 3 shows the block
diagram of a circuit which contains four flip-flops connected
in a scan chain. The attack assumes that an attacker can switch
between functional and scan modes at any point of time.
Attack Scenario: We explain the attack using the example
shown in Figure 3. Please note that in functional mode,
the flip-flop DFF1 gets affected only by its input cone of
dependency ICODDFF1. ICODDFF1 has six primary inputs
(I1 → I6), feeding several combinational logic gates. It
also contains two key-gates with key-inputs K1 and K2. In
functional mode, DFF1 stores the output of ICODDFF1
(line m). Similarly, the outputs of the ICOD of other flip-flops
also get stored in the corresponding flip-flops. We can observe
the content of these flip-flops by switching from functional to
scan mode and shifting them out through the scan out port SO.
The observability introduced by the scan chain helps us to treat
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Figure 3: Basic idea of scan based attack on logic encryption
the output of the ICOD of each flip-flop as a pseudo-output.
This allows us to partition the circuit into multiple smaller
instances based on the ICOD of each flip-flop. For example,
we can treat the ICODDFF1 as a standalone circuit consisting
of six inputs (I1 → I6) and one output (m). We can apply
any input pattern to I1→ I6 in functional mode and observe
the value of m by shifting out the content of DFF1 in scan
mode. As ICODDFF1 contains only two key-gates, it would
be easier to apply brute force attack on ICODDFF1 to extract
these keys. The attacker can apply the same input pattern to the
ICODDFF1 of an encrypted and an activated IC and observe
m to extract K1 and K2. Similarly, the keys, affecting the
ICODs of other flip-flops, can also be extracted by treating
those ICODs as separate independent logic circuits.
Input : Encrypted Netlist; Activated IC;
Output : Key values;
begin
for All the scan flip-flops do
Find the input cone of dependency (ICOD);
while All the keys are not extracted do
while The ICOD of all the scan flip-flops are not explored do
Find out the scan flip-flop FFleast with the least number of
key-gates in its ICOD;
if The ICOD of FFleast contains other flip-flops (FFj ) then
Operate the circuit in scan mode;
Treat the outputs of FFjs as pseudo-inputs by uploading
any values in FFjs through scan chain;
Switch to functional mode;
Apply input pattern in functional mode;
Switch to scan mode;
Shift out the content of the scan chain through scan out port;
Observe the output of the ICOD of FFleast of both encrypted
and activated ICs;
Apply brute-force attack on ICOD of FFleast to extract the
keys affecting it;
if Any key-gate does not belong to the ICOD of any scan flip-flop
then
Apply logic cone attack to extract the key;
Algorithm 1: Proposed Scan-based Attack
Algorithm 1 outlines the proposed scan based attack on logic
encryption. The attack starts with partitioning the circuit into
several smaller sub-circuits based on the ICOD of each flip-
flop. Next, it searches the flip-flop (FFleast) with the least
number of key-gates in its ICOD. The keys corresponding
to that ICOD are extracted using brute force attack. Typical
logic cone based attack considers the ICOD of any output
5to perform the attack. We can observe from Figure 3 that the
input cone of dependency ICODOi of the output Oi contains
more primary inputs, logic gates, and key-gates compared
to the ICOD of any flip-flop. As the complexity of brute
force attack exponentially increases with the number of key-
gates and the size of a circuit, it is much easier to apply
the attack on the ICOD of any flip-flop compared to that
of any output. The attack iteratively searches for the flip-flop
with the least number of key-gates (FFleast) in its ICOD
and extract those keys. A brute force attack on an ICOD
which contains only combinational elements is straightforward.
However, if the ICOD of FFleast contains other flip-flops
(say FFjs), an attacker has to operate the circuit in scan
mode to use the outputs of the FFjs as pseudo-primary inputs
before switching back to the functional mode of operation.
For example, DFF4 contains DFF2 in its input cone of
dependency ICODDFF4. Therefore, at the time of extracting
the keys present in ICODDFF4, first, we operate the circuit
in scan mode and upload any value to DFF2 and then switch
to functional mode. This mutes the ICODDFF2 and reduces
the ICOD of DFF4 from ICODDFF4 to (ICODDFF4 -
ICODDFF2).
The attack can be applied to any state-of-the-art logic
encryption technique provided the circuit contains flip-flops
with DfT infrastructure for infield testing. The complexity of
the attack does not depend on the total number of key-gates
and primary inputs. Rather it depends on the number of key-
gates present in the largest ICOD of any flip-flop and the
number of primary inputs affecting that ICOD. If the largest
ICOD of any flip-flop contains K1 key-gates and M1 primary
inputs, the complexity of the attack reduces from O(2M+K) to
O(2M1+K1). In general, K1  K and M1 < M , therefore,
it becomes easy to apply the attack on a large complex circuit,
encrypted with a sufficiently large number of keys.
To examine the effectiveness of scan based attack, we
have applied the attack on several ISCAS’89 and ITC’99
benchmarks, which are encrypted using typical XOR/XNOR
based encryption strategy (128-bit key). Table I reports the
complexities of both scan-based and brute force attacks (in
the format, scan attack complexity / brute force complexity)
on different ISCAS’89 and ITC’99 benchmarks. We observe
that the scan based attack can drastically reduce the attack
complexity. For example, the brute force attack complexity on
s15850 is 2128+77 = 2205, which can be reduced down to 262
by exploiting the scan chains of the design. This makes several
other attacks feasible, which would not have been possible
otherwise. This attack shows the importance of introduction
of encryption in scan chains, which has not been considered
in the literature.
VI. ENCRYPT FLIP-FLOP: A NEW LOGIC ENCRYPTION
STRATEGY
In the previous section, we have shown that any state-of-
the-art logic encryption technique is vulnerable to scan based
attack. To restrict the leakage of information through the scan
chain, we propose to introduce obfuscation in the scan chain
itself. In this section, we propose a new logic encryption
strategy called Encrypt Flip-Flop, which encrypts the outputs
Table I: Complexity of scan attack on several ISCAS’89 and
ITC’99 benchmarks (K = 123 for s9234, K = 128 for others)
Circuit
Name
Attack complexity
Scan / Brute Force
Circuit
Name
Attack complexity
Scan / Brute Force
s5378 266 / 2163 b17 261 / 2165
s9234 251 / 2159 b18 247 / 2165
s13207 256 / 2190 b19 251 / 2152
s15850 262 / 2205 b20 264 / 2160
s38417 269 / 2156 b21 258 / 2160
s38584 274 / 2166 b22 253 / 2160
of the flip-flops of a sequential design. Flip-flops produce two
outputs, Q, and Q. Generally, one of these two outputs (either
Q or Q) is connected to the next logic level, while the other
remains unconnected. We propose to encrypt the outputs of
some of the flip-flops by inserting MUXes in front of them.
The two inputs of the MUX are connected to the Q and Q
lines of the flip-flop, and its output is connected to the next
logic level. The MUX acts as a key-gate, while the select line
of the MUX acts as the key. Either Q or Q line passes to the
next logic gate depending upon the value of the select line.
Figure 4 depicts the basic idea of our proposed Encrypt Flip-
Flop strategy. If the input to the flip-flop is X , a key-input of
K = 0 passes X to the output of the key-gate, while a value
of K = 1 passes X .
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Figure 4: The basic idea of Encrypt Flip-Flop strategy
A designer can selectively opt to pass a Q / Q value to
the output of a key-gate, where an unencrypted design should
propagate a Q / Q value to the next logic level. The inversion
introduced by this process can be bubble pushed further deep
into the circuit using de Morgan’s law. Therefore, any key-gate
can have a key value of either ’0’ or ’1’. A wrong key-input
propagates an inverted input to the next logic level, which
leads to an erroneous functionality of the circuit. It may be
noted that MUX-based encryption has also been proposed in
[8]. However, in [8], the two inputs (true and false lines) of
a key-gate (MUX) may carry same value (either 0 or 1) for
certain input combinations. In such scenarios, even a wrong
key propagates correct value to the next logic level. This
situation never occurs in our case as we consider Q and Q
of a flip-flop as the two inputs of a key-gate. Unlike [11], our
method does not use an extra inverter for each key-gate to
ensure two different values in the two inputs of a key-gate.
Figure 5 shows an example encryption of the circuit of Figure
2(a) using our proposed Encrypt Flip-Flop strategy. In general,
a sequential circuit of medium size contains hundreds of flip-
flops, while the number of flip-flops in a larger design can be
in the order of thousands. Depending upon the permissible area
constraint, a designer can encrypt a sufficiently large number
of flip-flops of a design. However, random selection of flip-
flops for encryption may expose a design to logic cone based
attacks. Proper selection of flip-flops for encryption plays an
important role to ensure the quality of security offered by the
6encrypted design.
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Figure 5: Encrypting the example circuit of Figure 2(a) using
Encrypt Flip-Flop strategy
A. Selection Of Flip-flops For Encryption
We have observed in Section III that the vulnerability of
a circuit against logic cone based attack increases if some
outputs of the circuit do not contain a sufficient number of
key-gates in their input cone of dependency. Therefore, the
primary focus of our key-gate location selection process is to
confine the effects of all the key-gates to a limited number
of outputs, and at the same time, ensuring that each of the
affected outputs contains all the key-gates in its input cone of
dependency. Let us assume, a circuit consists of M inputs, O
outputs and L flip-flops. We would like to encrypt the circuit
using a K-bit key. We will select K out of L flip-flops, which
satisfy the following criterion.
Each of the outputs, affected by any of these K flip-
flops, must contain all of these K flip-flops in its input
cone of dependency.
We encrypt these K flip-flops by inserting a MUX in front
of each of them. The select lines of these MUXes act as key-
inputs. The process ensures that the input cone of dependency
of any output contains either all or none of the key-gates. None
of the outputs contains only few key-gates in its input cone of
dependency. Thus, an attacker does not get an opportunity to
minimize the effort of brute force search by employing logic
cone based attack.
Algorithm 2 describes the proposed strategy of selecting
the flip-flops for encryption. The process starts by finding the
flip-flops present in the input cone of dependency (ICOD)
of all the O outputs of a circuit. Next, we select O′ outputs
(O′ ≤ O) with the largest number of flip-flops in their
overlapping input cone of dependency (ICODoverlap). Let,
ICODoverlap contains L1 (L1 ≤ L) flip-flops. We name this
set of L1 flip-flops as Loverlap. Each of these L1 flip-flops
affects all the O′ outputs. However, some of these L1 flip-
flops may also affect some outputs from the set of O − O′
outputs. Let, L2 flip-flops (out of the L1 flip-flops) affect any
of the O − O′ outputs. As none of these O − O′ outputs
contains a sufficient number of key-gates in its input cone
of dependency, the keys corresponding to these L2 flip-flops
can be extracted by applying logic cone based attack on these
O−O′ outputs. Therefore, these L2 flip-flops are not suitable
candidates for encryption. We name this set of L2 flip-flops
as Lweak. We exclude these L2 flip-flops from Loverlap and
create a new set (Lstrong) of L3 = L1− L2 flip-flops. None
of the elements of the set Lstrong affects any output other
than the O′ outputs. All of these L3 flip-flops are the potential
candidates for encryption. We can select any K flip-flops from
these L3 flip-flops and encrypt them by inserting MUX in front
of them. Encryption of these K flip-flops ensures that each of
the O′ outputs includes all the K key-gates, and other O−O′
outputs contain no key-gate in their input cone of dependency.
Input : Original Netlist; Key size (K);
Output : Encrypted Netlist;
begin
for Each of the O outputs do
Find the flip-flops present in its input cone of dependency (ICOD);
Form a set of O′ outputs with the largest number of flip-flops (Loverlap)
in the overlapping input cone of dependency (ICODoverlap);
for each element of Loverlap do
if The flip-flop affects any output other than the O’ outputs then
Include the flip-flop in the set Lweak;
Form a new set Lstrong = Loverlap - Lweak;
Select K flip-flops from the set Lstrong ;
Insert a MUX in front of these K flip-flops;
Algorithm 2: Key-gate Location Selection
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Figure 6: Selection of flip-flops for encryption based on
Algorithm 2
The process can be explained using the example of Figure
6. Let, the example circuit contains 10 flip-flops, namely FF1
to FF10 and 6 outputs, namely O1 to O6. Input cone of
dependency of all the outputs is represented using a graph
(Figure 6). Each of the flip-flops and the outputs is represented
by a node in the graph, while an edge between an output and
a flip-flop signifies that the flip-flop belongs to the input cone
of dependency of that output. For example, the input cone of
dependency of output O1 contains the flip-flops FF1, FF2,
and FF3. It may be observed from the figure that the outputs
O2, O3, O4, and O5 have the flip-flops FF3, FF4, FF5,
FF6, FF7, and FF8 common in their ICODs and these
ICODs construct the largest overlapping ICOD. Therefore,
according to the example, ICODoverlap contains the outputs
O2, O3, O4, and O5 and Loverlap contains the flip-flops FF3,
7FF4, FF5, FF6, FF7, and FF8. Please note that the flip-
flop FF3 also affects the output O1 which is not an element of
the list O′. If we encrypt the output of FF3, it would be easier
to extract the corresponding key by applying logic cone based
attack on the output O1. Therefore, the flip-flop FF3 belongs
to the set Lweak. We exclude FF3 from Loverlap and construct
the set Lstrong which contains the flip-flops FF4, FF5, FF6,
FF7, and FF8. It may be noted that every element of Lstrong
affects only the outputs of the list O′. Encryption of the flip-
flops of the set Lstrong ensures protection against logic cone
based attack.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the security of our proposed
approach against several attacks proposed in the literature. We
have already discussed about sustainability against logic cone
analysis based attack [14]. Therefore, we mainly focus on other
security threats like path sensitization attack [9], scan based
attack, SAT attack [16] etc.
A. Security Evaluation Against Path Sensitization Attack
In this section, we examine whether a path sensitization
attack can be performed on a design encrypted using our
proposed strategy. Path sensitization attack on the proposed
logic encryption is slightly different from the attack proposed
in [9]. Unlike [9], we cannot directly propagate a key-value
to an output. Rather, we have to apply a specific value to the
input of an encrypted flip-flop and propagate that value to the
output by selecting a key-value (either 0 or 1). Comparison of
the output with the output of an activated IC decides whether
the applied key is correct or wrong. Therefore, to perform path
sensitization attack, it is important to control the input of an
encrypted flip-flop. Input of a flip-flop can be controlled in
two ways. Input of few flip-flops can be directly controlled by
manipulating the primary inputs (although the number of such
flip-flop is very less). Inputs of the rest of the flip-flops can also
be controlled, provided an activated IC has the scan facility for
the purpose of in-field testing. This is very common as most
of the ICs have the DfT (Design-for-Testability) infrastructure.
Case I: To demonstrate the attack, we consider the same
example circuit of Figure 5 which is encrypted using our
proposed method. We assume that the circuit has the DfT
infrastructure. Therefore, we convert the flip-flops into scan
flip-flops (Figure 7) and connect them in a chain. Our objective
is to extract the keys K1 and K2. It may be noted that the
input of DFF1 can be directly controlled from the primary
inputs (I1, I2, and I3). The value of DFF1 can be propagated
to the output O1 by selecting any value of K1 in the encrypted
netlist and setting the lines m2 (m2 = 1), m5 (m5 = 0), and m4
(m4 = 1) to their non-controlling values by manipulating the
primary inputs. We compare the value of O1 of the activated
IC for the same input vector. If both the outputs are same,
we decide that the selected value of K1 is correct, else the
correct value of K1 should be the other one. On the other
hand, input of DFF2 cannot be directly controlled from the
primary inputs. Therefore, we switch from functional mode to
scan mode and insert a value ’X’ (either ’0’ or ’1’) to the input
of DFF2. Next, we switch from scan mode to functional mode
and propagate the value of ’X’ to the output O2 and extract
K2 in the similar fashion as K1.
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Figure 7: Path sensitization attack on Encrypt Flip-Flip, Case
Study I
Case II: Now, let us consider the scenario of Figure 8. Here,
we encrypt the flip-flop DFF4 as well. The input of DFF4
cannot be controlled from the primary inputs. Hence, we try to
control the input of DFF4 via the scan chain. However, it may
be noted that the scan input (SI) of flip-flop DFF2 is only
externally accessible in an activated IC. All the scan inputs are
applied only through this SI line. In normal scenario, where
none of the flip-flops are encrypted, we can easily upload our
desired value to the input of DFF4 by applying that value to
SI and scan shifting the value to the input of DFF4. However,
in our encrypted design, if we do not know the values of the
keys K1 and K2, we cannot figure out which value is actually
propagating to the next scan flip-flop of an encrypted flip-flop.
Therefore, it is not possible to control the input of DFF4,
hence the key K3 cannot be extracted using path sensitization
attack.
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Figure 8: Path sensitization attack on Encrypt Flip-Flip, Case
Study II
Observation: From the above example, one can observe
that our proposed encryption strategy is vulnerable to path
sensitization attack only if the input of an encrypted flip-
flop is either directly controllable from the primary inputs or
connected to the scan in (SI) line of the scan chain (i.e. the
first flip-flop of a scan chain). In general, very few flip-flops
can be controlled from the primary inputs. On the other hand,
the input of only one encrypted flip-flop of a scan chain can
be controlled externally. Sensitization of that key can also be
restricted if sufficiently large number of key-gates interfere
in the sensitization path of that key. This can be done by
selecting an encrypted flip-flop, which has high interference
in its sensitization path, as the first flip-flop of a scan chain.
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Figure 9: An example scan chain, encrypted using Encrypt Flip-Flop technique
Therefore, path sensitization attack cannot be performed on our
proposed encryption strategy, if the flip-flops, whose inputs are
not controllable from the primary inputs, are selected for the
purpose of encryption.
B. Security Evaluation Against Scan-based Attack
Earlier, we have shown that scan paths can be exploited
to reduce the efforts of different attacks on logic encryption.
Unlike other encryption techniques, our proposed strategy does
not include any key-gate in the input cone of dependency
of a scan flip-flop, thus, prevents an attacker from using the
scan chains to apply divide and conquer based scan attack,
proposed in Section V. However, as we encrypt the scan flip-
flops themselves, scan shifting can be a potential source of
leakage of key information. In this section, we investigate the
resilience of our proposed Encrypt Flip-Flop technique against
scan based attack. For this purpose, we consider an example
circuit with a scan chain containing ten flip-flops (Figure 9),
five (DFF1, DFF3, DFF5, DFF8, and DFF9) of them are
encrypted using Encrypt Flip-Flop technique. We consider two
scenarios where we apply the same input scan vector under two
different key setups and analyze the data extracted by shifting
out the contents of the scan chain.
Case I: Let us assume the correct values of five keys of the
example Figure 9 be K1 = 0, K2 = 1, K3 = 0, K4 = 1,
and K5 = 0. We upload the scan vector ”1011010001” into
the scan chain through the scan in (SI) port. Figure 10 shows
how this scan data shifts through the scan chain for the chosen
key-values. As the values of the keys K2 and K4 are ’1’,
inverted values get shifted to the next flip-flops (i.e. DFF4
and DFF9). Another inversion is caused by the connection
between Q output of DFF6 to the input of DFF7. Thus
a scan vector faces three inversions during the scan shift.
However, an attacker does not have direct access to the content
of the intermediate flip-flops (DFF2 → DFF9). Shifting
out the content of the intermediate scan flip-flops through
the scan out port (i.e. the output of DFF10) is the only
option to observe these values. Figure 10 shows that under
this particular key setup, the scanned out vector is exactly the
inverted one of the uploaded input vector.
Case II: Now, let us consider a different key (K1 = 1,
K2 = 0, K3 = 1, K4 = 1, and K5 = 0) and the same input
scan vector ”1011010001”. Figure 11 shows the scan shift
under this particular key setup. In this case, we can observe
that the scanned out vector is exactly the same as the uploaded
input vector.
Observation: We have observed that in the first scenario,
output scan vector gets inverted, while in the second one, it
remains unaltered. Please note that a scan vector gets inverted
DFF1 DFF2 DFF3 DFF4 DFF5 DFF6 DFF7 DFF8 DFF9 DFF10Clk
cycle K1 = 0 K2 = 1 K3 = 0 K4 = 1 K5 = 0
1 1 × × × × × × × × ×
2 0 1 × × × × × × × ×
3 1 0 1 × × × × × × ×
4 1 1 0 0 × × × × × ×
5 0 1 1 1 0 × × × × ×
6 1 0 1 0 1 0 × × × ×
7 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 × × ×
8 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 × ×
9 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 ×
10 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
11 × 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
12 × × 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
13 × × × 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
14 × × × × 0 1 0 0 0 1
15 × × × × × 0 0 0 1 0
16 × × × × × × 1 0 1 1
17 × × × × × × × 1 1 1
18 × × × × × × × × 0 1
19 × × × × × × × × × 0
Figure 10: Shifting of scan data through the example scan
chain of Figure 9, considering the key ”01010”
DFF1 DFF2 DFF3 DFF4 DFF5 DFF6 DFF7 DFF8 DFF9 DFF10Clk
cycle K1 = 1 K2 = 0 K3 = 1 K4 = 1 K5 = 0
1 1 × × × × × × × × ×
2 0 0 × × × × × × × ×
3 1 1 0 × × × × × × ×
4 1 0 1 0 × × × × × ×
5 0 0 0 1 0 × × × × ×
6 1 1 0 0 1 1 × × × ×
7 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 × × ×
8 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 × ×
9 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 ×
10 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
11 × 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
12 × × 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
13 × × × 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
14 × × × × 0 0 1 1 1 0
15 × × × × × 1 1 1 0 1
16 × × × × × × 0 1 0 0
17 × × × × × × × 0 0 0
18 × × × × × × × × 1 0
19 × × × × × × × × × 1
Figure 11: Shifting of scan data through the example scan
chain of Figure 9, considering the key ”10110”
in the process of shifting through a scan flip-flop if either the
Q output of an unencrypted flip-flop is connected to the next
flip-flop or a ’1’ value of the key-input of an encrypted flip-flop
is selected. The total number of these two cases decides the
number of times a scan vector gets inverted during the shifting
through a scan chain. The output vector remains unaltered
for an even number of inversions, while an odd number of
inversions inverts the output. For example, the Q output of
only DFF6 is connected to the next flip-flop in the scan chain
structure of Figure 9, thus a single inversion is caused by all
the unencrypted flip-flops. In scenario I, two key-bits are ’1’,
which indicates the scan vector gets inverted twice by all the
encrypted flip-flops. Thus, the total number of inversions is
three and the final output gets inverted. Under this particular
example scan infrastructure, an inverted output can also be
observed in the cases where an even number of key-bits are ’1’.
Similarly, in scenario II, three key-bits are ’1’, which implies
that the scan vector gets inverted for a total of four times
and finally produces non-inverted output. Any key with an
odd number of ’1’s produces the same output. This is true
for any input scan vector. Please note that the number of
connections from the Q output of an unencrypted flip-flop to
the next flip-flop can be easily identified by observing the scan
9chain structure. However, it is not possible to figure out the
number of ’1’s present in a key by observing the output vector.
Therefore, an output scan vector can only identify whether
a key contains an even or an odd number of ’1’s in it. It
does not reveal any information regarding the number of ’1’s
present in a key. A K bit key has 2K−1 possible combination
of keys, where an even number of bits are ’1’, and 2K−1
possible combination of keys, where an odd number of bits
are ’1’. For example, out of the 32 possible key combinations,
16 key combinations of the Figure 9 have either an even or an
odd number of ’1’s. Therefore, by observing the type of scan
output, an attacker can eliminate 2K−1 possible combination
of keys which can only reduce the complexity of a brute force
attack from O(2M+K) to O(2M+(K−1)).
Reset-and-Scan Attack on Encrypt Flip-Flop: Simple
scan operation does not reveal any key, as the logic values
of the scan cells before scan operation remain unknown to
the attacker. However, a design with global reset is vulnerable
to reset-and-scan attack. Figure 12 demonstrates the attack on
the example scan chain of Figure 9, considering the key to
be ”01010”. A global reset configures all the flip-flops to a
known logic value (i.e. logic value ’0’). A subsequent scan
operation inverts the contents of the scan cells depending upon
the key values, and finally, the scanned out vector reflects these
inversions. By observing the inversion positions in the scanned
out vector, the attacker can identify the locations of the keys
which are responsible for those inversions. For example, the
scan out vector in Figure 12 experiences three inversions at
3rd, 5th and 8th positions. These three inversions are caused
by the key K4 = 1, the Q line of DFF6 and the key K2 = 1,
respectively. It may be noted that the respective positions of
DFF8 (associated with key-gate KG4), DFF6 and DFF3
(associated with key-gate KG2) are 3rd, 5th and 8th from the
scan out port, which are same as the inversion positions. The
inversion in the 5th position is created by the Q line of DFF6,
which can be identified from the netlist of the design. The
other two inversions in 3rd and 8th positions reveal the values
of K4 and K2 as logic ’1’. No other inversion in the scanned
out vector suggests that all other key-bits are ’0’. This way, a
scan operation, immediately after a global reset can reveal all
the keys.
3rd
5th
8th
Figure 12: An example of reset-and-scan attack on the example
scan chain of Figure 9, considering the key ”01010”
Countermeasure Against Reset-and-Scan Attack: To pre-
vent the reset-and-scan attack, a designer must restrict a scan
operation, immediately after a global reset. To do so, we
propose to introduce a scan controller into the design. Figure
13 shows the architecture of the proposed scan controller.
Instead of applying the scan enable (SE) input directly to the
select lines of the scan MUXs, we apply the SE and reset
(RST) inputs to the scan controller. The output of the scan
controller is applied to the select lines of the scan MUXs. The
scan controller operates as follows. A global reset makes RST
= 1. In the first clock cycle, the output of the AND gate D
resets all the flip-flops. In the next clock cycle, the flip-flop
DFF propagates the value of RST to the input of the AND
gate B. For an immediate scan operation, the value of SE
needs to be ’1’. This sets the output of B to the logic value
’1’. Although RST becomes ’0’ from the next cycle onward,
as the output of B is fed back to the DFF via the OR gate
A, the output of B remains ’1’. As the values of both B and
SE are ’1’, the output of the XOR gate C becomes ’0’. This
disables the scan operation. The value of B remain ’1’ until
SE becomes ’0’. Therefore, the scan controller does not allow
the attacker to perform a scan operation, immediately after a
global reset. However, when we switch from normal mode to
scan mode, only the value of SE becomes ’1’, and the value of
RST remains ’0’. Therefore, the value of B remains ’0’ and the
output of C becomes ’1’, which enables the scan operation. As
the integration of the scan controller restricts scan after a reset
operation, an attacker cannot interpret the keys by observing
the scanned out response, which helps us to prevent the reset-
and-scan attack.
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Figure 13: Scan controller to prevent reset-and-scan attack
C. Security Evaluation Against SAT-based attack
SAT-based attack is applicable only on combinational cir-
cuits. However, the attack can also be performed on sequential
circuits in presence of DfT architecture [16]. To perform the
attack, an attacker requires full controllability and observability
of all the scan cells, which is very much possible in traditional
scan chains. However, this is not possible in our proposed En-
crypt Flip-Flop technique as we restrict the controllability and
observability of the internal scan cells. To illustrate our claim,
we consider the same example encrypted scan configuration
of Figure 9. We apply the input scan vector ”1011010001”
under the key configuration of K1 = 0, K2 = 1, K3 = 0,
K4 = 1, and K5 = 0. It takes ten clock cycles to upload the
scan vector to all the scan cells. It can be observed from the
Figure 10 that, after ten clock cycles, the contents of the scan
cells are ”1001011110”. If we apply the same input scan vector
under the key configuration of K1 = 1, K2 = 0, K3 = 1,
K4 = 1, and K5 = 0, the contents of the scan cells would
be ”1111000001” (Figure 11). We observe that the same input
scan vector upload different values in the scan cells under
different key setups. We have also observed in the previous
section that no information can be extracted from the scan
out response. As an attacker does not know the correct keys
of an activated IC, it is not possible to use the scan-chain to
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Table II: Details of different benchmark circuits and execution times of the proposed Encrypt Flip-flip strategy
Circuit
Name
#
Inputs
#
Outputs
#
Gates
#
DFFs
#Candidate
DFFs
#Affected
Outputs
Affected Output
Coverage (%)
Encryption
Time
s5378 35 49 2958 179 166 49 100 2.75 sec
s9234 36 39 5808 211 123 19 48.7 2.98 sec
s13207 62 152 8589 638 377 72 47.3 52.91 sec
s15850 77 150 10306 534 447 27 18 45.2 sec
s38584 38 304 20679 1426 1425 268 88.15 43 min 7 sec
s38417 28 106 23815 1636 1448 33 31.13 8 min 5 sec
b17 37 97 29267 1415 1321 30 30.92 39 min 8 sec
b18 37 23 97569 3320 3191 20 86.95 113 min 46 sec
b19 24 30 196855 6642 6157 27 90 695 min 9 sec
b20 32 22 17648 490 449 22 100 4 min 4 sec
b21 32 22 17972 490 449 22 100 4 min 6 sec
b22 32 22 26195 735 641 22 100 4 min 30 sec
read/write the values of all flip-flops in the design. Restricted
controllability and observability of the scan chain inhibits an
attacker to use the inputs and outputs of the flip-flops as pseudo
primary outputs and inputs, respectively. Thus, our proposed
encryption strategy has the inherent ability to prevent SAT-
based attack. Unlike other SAT-preventive measures [19], [22],
Encrypt Flip-Flop strategy does not require any extra hardware
infrastructure to rule out SAT-based attack. Moreover, removal
attack is also not applicable on the proposed method.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our experiments
on several ISCAS’89 and ITC’99 benchmarks [34]. We select
the benchmarks of different sizes and encrypt them using
our proposed Encrypt Flip-flip strategy. The key-gate location
selection algorithm (Algorithm 2) is implemented using a
C code which identifies the flip-flops affecting the largest
overlapping input cone of dependency of the outputs of a
circuit. All such flip-flops are the potential candidates for
encryption. We select K random flip-flops from these flip-
flops and encrypt them by inserting a MUX in front of each
of them. Table II reports the number of inputs, outputs, logic
gates and flip-flops present in each of the selected bench-
marks. The benchmarks s5378, s9234, s13207, and s15850
are relatively small, with gate counts in the range of 10K.
s38417, s38584, b17, b20, b21, and b22 are the medium size
benchmarks, with gate counts less than 30K, while b18 and
b19 are large benchmarks, with gate counts 100K and 200K
respectively. Columns 6 and 7 of the table report the number
of flip-flops present in the largest overlapping input cone of
dependency (ICODoverlap) and the number of outputs getting
affected by this ICODoverlap, respectively. For example, 72
out of 152 outputs of the benchmark s13207 form the largest
ICODoverlap, which includes 377 (out of 638) flip-flops.
Therefore, any subset of these 377 flip-flops can be encrypted
using our proposed method. One may observe that all the
benchmarks include a sufficient number of flip-flops in the
largest ICODoverlap, which allows us to encrypt a design with
an adequate number of keys. A wrong key can corrupt only
the outputs which are included in the ICODoverlap. Rest of
the outputs remain unaffected irrespective of the correctness
of the keys, as the values of the flip-flops included in the
ICODoverlap do not propagate to those outputs. Column 8
of the table reports the percentage of the total number of
outputs covered by the largest ICODoverlap of each of the
benchmarks. The affected output coverage of the benchmarks
s5378, s38584, b18, b19, b20, b21, and b22 is very high, which
indicates that most of the outputs of these circuits get affected
by any wrong key. On the other hand, the affected output
coverage of the benchmarks s9234 and s13207 are medium,
while the ICODoverlap of the benchmarks s15850, s38417,
and b17 have poor output coverages. Thus, only a few outputs
of these benchmarks get affected by a wrong key. Column 9 of
the table reports the encryption time of our proposed Encrypt
Flip-Flop technique, which is performed on a computer with
3.20 GHz Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3470 processor and 4 GB
RAM. Our proposed technique takes very small amount of
time (less than a minute) to encrypt the smaller benchmarks
like s5378, s9234, s13207, and s15850. The medium size
benchmarks like s38417, b20, b21, and b22 can be encrypted
in less than 10 minutes using our proposed method, while the
other two medium size benchmarks s38584 and b17 require
less than 45 minutes to get encrypted. The encryption time of
the larger benchmark b18 (100K gates) is less than 2 hours.
Only the benchmark b19, with 200K gates, required more than
11 hours to get encrypted by our proposed method. Therefore,
on an average, the encryption time of our proposed strategy is
reasonably low, which indicates the simplicity of the Encrypt
Flip-flip technique.
A. Area, Power, and Delay Overheads
To evaluate the area, power, and delay overheads of our
proposed encryption technique, we encrypt the benchmarks
with 128-bit keys. We synthesize each of the designs (both
encrypted and unencrypted versions) using Synopsys Design
Vision tool [35] (using Faraday 90nm library), and calculate
the overheads of our proposed scheme. To compare the over-
heads with other encryption strategies, we also encrypt the
benchmarks using typical XOR/XNOR based ( [3], [8], [9]),
MUX-based [8] and Obfuscation Cell (OC) based [11] encryp-
tion strategies and synthesize those encrypted benchmarks and
calculate the overheads for each of them. Figure 14 compares
the area, power, and delay overheads of our Encrypt Flip-flop
method with other encryption strategies. Please note that the
benchmark s9234 has a maximum of 123 flip-flops as potential
candidate for encryption (refer to Table II). Therefore, the
results shown in the Figure 14 consider K = 123 for s9234
and K = 128 for rest of the benchmarks.
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Figure 14: Comparison of area, power and delay overheads between different logic encryption strategies (K = 123 for s9234,
K = 128 for others)
Figure 14a also reports the estimated area overheads of
SARLock [19] and Anti-SAT [22] methods, which are capable
of preventing the powerful SAT attack. For a K-bit key, K+1
XOR gates and 2K + 1 AND gates are required to build the
infrastructure of the SARLock method [19], while the extra
hardware requirements for the Anti-SAT method (considering
N -bit Anti-SAT block) are 3N + 1 XOR/XNOR gates, N 2-
input MUXes, 1 N -input NAND gate, 1 N -input AND gate
and 1 2-input AND gate [22]. Both of these SARLock and
Anti-SAT methods need to be integrated with any typical
XOR/XNOR-based (either Strong Logic Locking or Fault
Analysis) encryption technique to encrypt a design. Due to
the high implementation complexity, we have not implemented
the SARLock and Anti-SAT methods. Instead, we estimate
the area overheads of these two methods by adding the area
of the extra hardware incurred by them with the hardware
overhead of the XOR/XNOR based encryption technique. For
this purpose, we refer to the data sheet of Faraday 90nm library
[36]. Table III presents the area units of different logic cells
(from the data sheet of Faraday 90nm library) that we consider
while estimating the area of the extra hardware incurred by the
SARLock and Anti-SAT methods. The method gives a rough
estimation of the area overheads of the SARLock and Anti-
SAT methods.
Table III: Cell area of different logic cells reported in Faraday
90nm library [36]
Cell Name Area Unit
2 input XOR 10
2 input XNOR 10
2 input MUX 9
2 input AND 5
2 input NAND 4
We can observe from Figure 14a that the area overhead of
the proposed Encrypt Flip-Flop method is comparable with
MUX-based [8], OC-based [11], and XOR/XNOR based ( [3],
[8], [9]) encryption strategies. However, unlike Encrypt Flip-
Flop technique, none of these methods can prevent SAT attack.
On the other hand, SAT-resilient techniques like SARLock [19]
and Anti-SAT [22] have higher area overheads compared to
our proposed method. We can also observe that SARLock has
higher hardware overheads compared to Anti-SAT. As we have
not implemented the SARLock and Anti-SAT techniques, we
could not calculate the power and delay overheads of these two
techniques. Thus, we could not compare the power and delay
overheads of our method with these two. Figure 14b shows the
comparison of power overhead our method with MUX-based,
OC-based, and XOR/XNOR based methods. Here also we can
observe that the power overhead of our Encrypt Flip-Flop
method is comparable with other encryption techniques. Figure
14c shows the comparison of delay overheads of different
strategies. Presence of key-gates in the critical path of a circuit
increases its delay. Thus, to encrypt a design without its
performance degradation, our strategy avoids the encryption of
the flip-flops which are present in the critical path of a circuit.
The delay overhead of our Encrypt Flip-Flop technique is zero
for all the benchmarks except s9234, when it is encrypted with
123-bit key. This is because we encrypt all the candidate flip-
flops, some of which are also a part of the critical paths of
the circuit. Excluding those flip-flops from encryption ensures
zero delay overheads for this circuit as well.
B. Output Corruptibility For Wrong Keys
One important metric to measure the quality of any en-
cryption technique is its ability to corrupt the outputs for
any wrong key. To measure the output corruptibility of our
proposed method, we simulate each benchmark with 10000
random input patterns. We vary the percentage of wrong keys
and measure the Hamming Distance between the correct and
the obtained outputs. Figure 15 shows the variation of %
output corruption with the variation of % of wrong keys for
different benchmarks (for K = 128). Please note that the
data shown in the Figure 15 consider the outputs affected by
the ICODoverlap (refer to Table II) while calculating the %
output corruption. We gradually increase the % of wrong keys
from 5% to 100% and check the % of output corruption for
different random input patterns. We can observe from the figure
that some benchmarks like s9234, s38417, b20, b21, and b22
offer high output corruption for wrong keys. Other benchmarks
like s5378, s15850, b17, b18, and b19 offer reasonable output
corruption for wrong keys, while the % output corruptibility of
the benchmarks s13207 and s38584 are low. It can be observed
from Table II that the numbers of affected outputs of s13207
and s38584 are high. Therefore, even a sufficient number of
output bit corruption show low % output corruption for these
two benchmarks. We can also observe from Figure 15 that for
all the benchmarks, we get a zero output corruption for some
of the input patterns even for a wrong key. This is because the
effect of wrong keys does not propagate to the outputs for those
input patterns. However, we found a zero output corruption
only for a few input patterns for all the benchmarks.
Figure 16 shows a comparison of average output corruption
between different logic encryption strategies for K = 128.
For this comparison, we mainly consider strong logic locking
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Figure 15: Variation of % output corruption with the variation of % of wrong keys for different benchmarks (K = 128)
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Figure 16: Comparison of average output corruption between
different logic encryption strategies for K = 128
(SLL) [9] and fault analysis (FA) based (both XOR and MUX-
based) [8] strategies. As Obfuscation Cell [11] and logic cone
prevention [14] based approaches need to be integrated with
either FA or SLL based approaches, we do not consider
them in the comparison. We can observe from Figure 16
that both XOR and MUX-based fault analysis approaches [8]
produce high average output corruption for wrong keys. As
the proposed Encrypt flip-Flop method does not take any
explicit measure to increase output corruption, the average
output corruption for this method varies from circuit to circuit.
Although the output corruption of the proposed method is not
as good as the fault analysis based approach, still it could
produce reasonable output corruption for wrong keys. Output
corruption for strong logic locking is comparatively low, which
is one of the shortcomings of the method.
C. Security Evaluation Against Hill Climbing Attack
Hill climbing attack [15] on conventional logic encryption
strategies exploits the linear relationship between the number
of wrong keys and output corruption. Due to this linearity, an
attacker can converge towards the correct keys by iteratively
flipping the key-inputs and reducing the output corruption.
However, the nature of the output corruptibility of our encryp-
tion strategy (Figure 15) depicts that the output corruption does
not increase linearly with the increase of the wrong keys. For
example, a key with 30% wrong bits can produce 40% output
corruption, while a key with 70% wrong bits can produce as
low as 10 to 5% output corruption for the benchmark b18.
Therefore, an attacker cannot predict the percentage of wrong
keys by observing the percentage of output corruption. Even if
an attacker obtains less output corruption by flipping a random
key-bit, it does not guarantee that the new key has less number
of wrong bits. Therefore, an attacker cannot take a decision
whether to flip a key-bit in an iteration to reduce the wrong
bits of a random key. This phenomenon helps our proposed
strategy to thwart the Hill Climbing Attack.
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Table IV: A comparative study between different logic encryption strategies
Encryption
Technique
Resilience Against Different Attacks Output
Corruptability
Hardware
overhead
(K-bit key)
Encryption
time
Implementation
ComplexityPath
Sensitization [9]
Logic
Cone [14]
Hill
Climbing [15] SAT [16]
Scan
Based
Random [3] × × × × × Low K XOR/(XNOR + NOT) Very Fast Very Simple
Fault Analysis (FA)
(XOR-based) [8] × × × × × High
K XOR/
(XNOR + NOT) Slow Medium
Fault Analysis
(MUX-based) [8] × × × × × High K MUX Slow Medium
Strong Logic
Locking (SLL) [9] × × × Low
K XOR/
(XNOR + NOT) Slow High
Obfuscation
Cell (OC) [11] × × × × × Low
K MUX +
K NOT Very Fast Very Simple
Logic Cone
Prevention [14] × × × × Low
K (MUX +
XOR/XNOR) Medium Medium
External
Key-Dependency [6] × × High
4K XOR/
(XNOR+NOT) Slow High
SLL+SARLock [19] × × Low 2K + 1 XORs +
2K + 1 ANDs Slow Very High
Anti-SAT + FA [22] × × × × Medium
K + 3N + 1 XOR/XNOR +
N 2-input MUX +
1 N-input (NAND + AND)
+ 1 2-input AND
Slow Very High
Encrypt Flip-Flop Varies from circuitto circuit K MUX + 1 XOR + 2 AND + 1 OR + 1 DFF Fast Medium
IX. DISCUSSION
In this section, we perform a comparative study between
different logic encryption strategies in terms of hardware
overhead, output corruptibility, implementation complexity,
encryption time and their ability to thwart different proposed
attacks. Table IV shows this comparative analysis between
different popular encryption techniques. We observe that ran-
dom insertion of the key-gates [3] is the most primitive
and simplest logic encryption approach, however, it offers
no security against the state-of-the-art attacks. Fault Analysis
(FA) based approaches [8] improve the output corruptibility
at the cost of higher implementation complexity and longer
encryption time compared to random logic encryption strategy.
These methods also fail to prevent any of the proposed
attacks. Strong Logic Locking (SLL) [9] can prevent path
sensitization [9] and hill climbing [15] attacks at the cost of
lower output corruptibility, higher implementation complexity,
and longer encryption time. Obfuscation Cell (OC) based
encryption technique [11] is an alternative of XOR/XNOR
based encryption. However, a simple replacement of some
wires of a netlist with the OCs cannot prevent any attack
or produce high output corruption for wrong keys. To obtain
either high output corruption or prevent some of the attacks,
the OC-based method needs to be integrated with either FA or
SLL based approach, respectively. Such integration nullifies
the advantages of simplicity and quick encryption time of
OC-based encryption technique. Logic cone prevention based
technique [14] can prevent logic cone based attack, however,
this method also needs to be integrated with SLL to prevent
other attacks. External Key-Dependency based approach [6]
can prevent path sensitization, hill climbing and logic cone
based attacks as well as offers high output corruption for
wrong keys at the cost of four times hardware overhead com-
pared to the conventional XOR/XNOR based logic encryption.
SARLock method [19], integrated with SLL, can prevent path
sensitization, hill climbing and SAT attacks at the cost of high
hardware overhead and implementation complexity. However,
this method offers low output corruptibility for wrong keys.
Anti-SAT method [22], integrated with FA based approach,
can prevent SAT attack at the cost of hardware overhead
and high implementation complexity. However, none of these
approaches can prevent the scan-based attack. On the other
hand, our proposed Encrypt Flip-Flop strategy can prevent all
the proposed attacks at the cost of low hardware overhead and
medium implementation complexity. The encryption time of
our proposed method is also very less. At the same time, our
method also produces reasonable output corruption for wrong
keys. All of the above observations justify the superiority of
the Encrypt Flip-Flop strategy over other state-of-the-art logic
encryption techniques.
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we have proposed a new scan based attack
which can extract the keys of any logically encrypted circuit,
irrespective of its size and the number of encryption keys,
provided the circuit contains DfT infrastructure for infield
testing and debugging. We have also proposed a new logic
encryption strategy called Encrypt Flip-FLop, which encrypts
the outputs of selected flip-flops by inserting a MUX. The
proposed strategy restricts the contrallability and observability
of the scan chains of a circuit, thus, prevents scan based attack.
It has inherent capability to thwart SAT attack, thus, unlike
other SAT-preventive methods, Encrypt Flip-FLop does not
require extra hardware to develop SAT-resilience infrastructure.
In contrary to other SAT-resilience methods, the proposed
Encrypt Flip-Flop strategy does not suffer from poor output
corruptibility and threat of removal attack. The proposed low
overhead encryption strategy can also prevent other state-of-
the-art attacks. Simple design and low encryption times are
the added advantages of the proposed encryption strategy.
In the future work, we will focus on utilizing the proposed
scan encryption technique to prevent the extraction of data
encryption keys of the cryptographic ICs.
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